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SEARCH AND SEIZURE
US. CONST. amend IV:
The right ofithe people to be secure in their person, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12:
The right cf the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
to be seized.
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
FIRST DEPARTMENT
People v. Robinson'
(decided July 6, 2000)
Defendant, Frank Robinson, was convicted of criminal
possession of a weapon in the third degree and the unlawful
wearing of a body vest, and thus sentenced to concurrent
indeterminate terms respectively, from eight years to life and one
and one-half to thr.ee years.2  Defendant appealed based on a
constitutional safeguard set forth in the Search and Seizure clause
of both the Federal 3 and New York State4 Constitutions.5  He
1271 A.D.2d 17, 711 N.Y.S.2d 384 (1st Dep't 2000).
2/d. at 390.
3 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides in pertinent part:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.. . ." Id.
4 N.Y.CONST. art. I, § 12. This section provides an pertinent part: "The right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures .... ." Id.
5 Robinson, 271 A.D.2d at 18, 711 N.Y.S.2d.at 385.
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claimed that the cab in which he was a passenger was
unconstitutionally stopped by police officers on the pretext of a
traffic violation and his right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures was violated.6 When a police officer stops an
automobile, that officer is temporarily detaining individuals. This
constitutes a seizure of persons within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, and Article I,
Section 12 of the New York State Constitution.8 The Appellate
Division, First Department, affirmed the decision of the lower
court and held that the vehicular stop by police was lawful under
the pretense that a traffic violation had occurred, regardless of the
police officer's subjective intent. 9
Two police officers were on motor patrol in Bronx County,
New York, when they saw a car traveling at a high rate of speed
going through a red light.' 0 The officers could not determine
whether there were any other occupants within the vehicle, and as
a result of the vehicle's size, assumed it was a livery cab. 1 The
police officers planned to give the cab driver a leaflet on safety
tips, however, when they pulled the cab over, one officer became
suspicious when the defendant, who was seated in the rear of the
cab, turned around repeatedly to view the officers. 12 One of the
police officers shined his flashlight into the rear of the cab where
defendant Robinson was seated, and noticed a puffy area around
the defendant's chest.' 3  The police officer believed that the
defendant was wearing a bulletproof vest, which he confirmed
through a pat down search of Robinson. 14 Furthermore, without
leaning into the car, the same officer shined his flashlight into the
6id.
7id.
8 See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996) (explaining
[t]emporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the
police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a
'seizure' of 'persons' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment).
9 Robinson, 271 A.D.2d at 22, 711 N.Y.S.2d at 390.
1d. at 18, 711 N.Y.S.2d at 385.
Id.
12 Id.
13 id.
14 Robinson, 271 A.D.2d at 18, 711 N.Y.S.2d at 385.
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passenger compartment and noticed a revolver loaded with
ammunition on the floor of the cab where defendant was sitting.' 5
On appeal, the defendant challenged the court's holding
that allowed the revolver into evidence, claiming that the weapon
should have been suppressed. 16 The defendant argued that the cab
was unconstitutionally stopped by the police because it was a
pretext stop based on a traffic violation.' The defendant contends
that the officers were staking out the vicinity, looking for criminal
activity toward cab drivers by their passengers, and therefore, the
officers never intended to issue a summons to the cab driver for the
traffic violation.
1 8
The Robinson court commenced its analysis by noting that
a pretext stop occurs when a police officer uses a traffic violation
as an excuse to stop a motor vehicle, to investigate the driver or
occupant about a matter unrelated to the claimed traffic violation. 
1 9
Although New York courts have recognized in New York v.
Laws, 2 that police officers do stop people under the pretext of a
traffic violation, they have not provided any structure or guidelines
to determine whether a stop is pretextual. 2 1 Therefore, several
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Robinson, 271 A.D.2d at 18, 671 N.Y.S.2d at 386. (citing People v. Laws, 213
A.D.2d 226, 623 N.Y.S.2d 860 (1st Dep't 1995). "A pretext stop has generally
been defined as a police officer's use of a traffic infraction as a subterfuge to
stop a motor vehicle in order to investigate the driver or occupant about an
unrelated matter." Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 213 A.D.2d 226, 671 N.Y.S.2d 439 (1st Dep't 1998).
21 People v. Washington, 238 A.D.2d 43, 671 N.Y.S.2d 439 (1st Dep't 1998).
Although New York's intermediate appellate court's appear to
have recognized the concept of pretext when a stop, ostensibly
for a traffic infraction, is utilized primarily for an unrelated
reason and have found such stops to be unjustified, they have
never provided a uniform analytical framework for
determining whether a stop is pretextual. As one commentator
has noted, 'New York courts have struggled to define the
appropriate standard in determining whether a stop is
pretextual. Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals has not
provided any guidelines in this area and, as a result, lower
courts have had to grapple with the subject.'
Id. (quoting KAMIS, NEW YORK SEARCHAND SEIZURE, at 364 (1997 ed.).
2000
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factors have been employed by the appellate division in attempting
to ascertain a police officer's motivation for a traffic stop.22 Using
these factors to determine whether the police vehicular stop was
legitimate can be difficult due to the broad nature of the factors.
23
The Court further commented that the New York Court of Appeals
has never expressly held pretextual search and seizure activities by
the police to be invalid under Article I, § 12 of the New York State
Constitution.24 However, state precedent set forth in New York v.
Laws, implies that the rule in New York appears to be that an
alleged traffic violation may not be used as a pretext to investigate
an unrelated matter.25  In order to determine whether a stop is
pretextual some departments apply a subjective test, where an
inquiry is made into the police officer's true motivation for
stopping the vehicle.26 The Appellate Division, First and Second
22 Id. at 50, 671 N.Y.S.2d at 446. Factors utilized to determine the primary
motivation of an officer include: whether the officer checked the registration of
the car or issued a summons to the driver; whether the officer followed the
vehicle for a distance prior to the stop; whether the officer's duty included
issuing traffic summonses. Id.
23 Robinson, 271 A.D.2d at 18, 711 N.Y.S.2d at 386.
24 Id. (citing People v. Washington, 238 A.D.2d 43,49, 671 N.Y.S.2d 439 (1st
Dep't 1998)).
25 People v. Laws, 213 A.D.2d 226, 623 N.Y.S.2d 860 (1st Dep't 1995).
An officer on patrol in a well known narcotics location and
aware that individuals in the area often came from out of state
to purchase large quantities of drugs, noticed defendant's car
with Connecticut license plates which was double parked. The
officer further testified that he noticed that the car had a
broken tail-light and decided to run the plates. The officer
thought that the defendant or somebody that he was with, was
in the area to buy drugs and pulled over the car. The court
found that the traffic violation was not the officer's reason for
pulling the defendant's car over. The court held that the
officer was motivated by an unfounded suspicion that criminal
activity was taking place. Further, the court noted that a
traffic violation may not be used as a pretext to investigate the
defendant on an unrelated matter, and granted suppression of
the evidence acquired during the unwarranted stop.
Id.
26 Robinson, 271 A.D.2d at 18, 711 N.Y.S.2d at 386. See People v. Califano,
255 A.D.2d 701, 680 N.Y.S.2d 700 (3d Dep't 1998); See also People v. Mc
Griff, 219 A.D.2d 829, 631 N.Y.S.2d 969 (4th Dep't 1995).
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department's 27 seem to follow an objective test, set forth by the
Supreme Court of the United State in Whren v. United States.
28
The Robinson court, in reaching its decision to follow an
objective test, looked to the Second Department's strong emphasis
towards the objective reasonableness of the stop. 29 In New York v.
Henry,30 the court held that "the legality of a search or seizure is to
be measured by the objective circumstances, and not by the
subjective motivation of the officer." 31 The Second Department
noted that an officer observing a vehicle with its headlights off,
late in the evening, is a valid reason for stopping the vehicle.
32
The court further noted that even if the officer had other subjective
investigative motivations for stopping the vehicle, the reason for
the stop remains 'valid, as long as the circumstances, viewed
objectively, justify the stop.33 This Second Department view was
afforded great authority and adopted by the First department in
Robinson. 
4
In addition to relying on the approach of the Second
Department, the First Department also adhered to the Federal rule.
The issue of pretextual traffic stops and the factors motivating
police officers when conducting them was addressed in Whren v.
United States.35 The Whren Court expressly held that a police
27 See People v. Henry, 258 A.D.2d 473, 685 N.Y.S.2d 100 (2d Dep't 1999)
(holding that the stop of defendant's car was valid based on the officer's
personal observation of a traffic violation, and "is no less valid because the
officer might also have been entertaining more serious suspicions," (quoting
People v. Dougherty, 251 A.D.2d 344, 673 N.Y.S.2d 742 (2d Dep't 1998))).
2' 517 U.S. 806 (1995).
29 Robinson, 271 A.D.2d at 23, 711 N.Y.S.2d at 385.
30 New York v. Henry, 258 A.D.2d 473, 685 N.Y.S.2d 100 (2d Dep't 1998).
3' Id. at 474, 685 N.Y.S.2d at 101. The court based its holding on Whren v.
United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 See also New York v. Ortiz, 265 A.D.2d 579, 698 N.Y.S.2d 36 (2d Dep't
1999) (holding that a pretextual stop was constitutional, even if the real purpose
behind the stop was an investigation of a homicide since the officer stopped the
vehicle based on his personal observation of a traffic violation; the stop remains
constitutional even if the officer might have been entertaining more serious
suspicions).
35 Whren, 517 U.S. at 808 (noting that "whether the temporary detention of a
motorist who the police have probable cause to believe has committed a civil
traffic violation is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against
2000
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officer's subjective reason for stopping an automobile is irrelevant,
so long as the stop is reasonable. 36  The Court stated that the
reasonableness of the officer's actions depends upon whether the
police had probable cause to believe that a traffic violation had
occurred.37 It should be noted that probable cause exists when a
police officer reasonably believes a crime will be, or has been
committed.38
In Scopo, police officers patrolling a popular drug area
noticed an idle vehicle at an intersection with a stop sign for an
unusually long period, followed by the vehicle suddenly turning
without signaling and driving away at a high rate of speed. 39 The
police officers stopped the vehicle claiming they intended to give
the driver a warning regarding his traffic violations, however, after
approaching the vehicle the police noticed a plastic bag containing
crack cocaine in the defendant's hand.40
At a pretrial suppression conference, the defense argued
that the police stop was not justified due to a lack of probable
cause. 41 Furthermore, they claimed that a reasonable suspicion did
not exist, which supported the notion that the defendants were
engaged in illegal drug-dealing activities. Therefore, the grounds
asserted by police for approaching the vehicle were based on mere
42pretext. The United States District Court denied the defendants'
motion to suppress the evidence of illegal drugs.4 3 The United
unreasonable seizures unless a reasonable officer would have been motivated to
stop the car by a desire to enforce the traffic laws").3 Id. at 809. /
37 Id. The Court was in agreement with the lower D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
which held that, "regardless of whether a police officer subjectively believes that
the occupants of an automobile may be engaging in some other illegal behavior,
a traffic stop is permissible as long as a reasonable officer in the same
circumstances could have stopped the car for the suspected traffic violation."
United States v. Whren, 53 F.3d 371, 374-75 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
38 United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777 (2d Cir. 1993).
39 Id. at 808 (describing U.S. v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777 (2d Cir. 1993).40 Id. at 809.
41 Id.
42/d.
43 Whren, 517 U.S. at 809 (explaining that the district court did not find any
facts indicating to the contrary -that the actions of the police officers, in
conducting the traffic stop, were outside their normal routine in conducting their
duties).
[Vol 17
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States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the
convictions, and held that a police officer who stops an automobile
with a subjective belief that the occupants may be engaging in
illegal behavior is permissible and not in violation of the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
44
The Supreme Court's reasoning in adopting an objective
approach is based on the Fourth Amendment's probable cause
analysis, whereby subjective intentions of a police officer are not
to be considered.a5 To ascertain whether probable cause exists, an
objective judgment of the police officer's actions in relation to the
facts surrounding the particular situation control over his
subjective, actual state of mind at the time.a6 The Federal
objective approach is utilized in respect to unreasonable searches
and seizures primarily to afford police officers the freedom to
enforce the law, without the necessity of hiding behind pretextual
excuses such as an officer's subjective primary motivation to stop
a vehicle for a traffic violation.
In Robinson, the court acknowledged that the New York
State Constitution grants broader protection to New York citizens
against unreasonable searches and seizures than does the Fourth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution. Furthermore, the court
noted that the language of the Fourth Amendment is identical to
the language of Article 1 § 12 of the New York State Constitution,
and assumingly confer similar rights.4a Supported by a desire for
consistency in implementing search and seizure rules, coupled with
the guise of New York precedents, the Robinson court adopted and
followed the Federal objective view. 49 Therefore, a police officer
who has probable cause to make a traffic stop, but has other
subjective investigative motivations to stop the vehicle in order to
44 United States v. Whren, 53 F.3d 371 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
45 Whren, 517 U.S. at 809.
46 People v. Jones, 219 A.D.2d 417, 643 N.YS.2d 987 (1st Dep't 1996) (quoting
Scott v. United States, 436 U.S.128 (U.S. Dist. Col. 1978).
47 id.
48 Robinson, 271 A.D.2d at 23, 711 N.Y.S.2d at 389.
49 Id.
2000
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investigate other possible unlawful conduct, will not be deemed
pretextual. 50
In conclusion, federal and state law are similar in respect to
their treatment of both the federal and state Search and Seizure
Clauses. 5 1 Presently, New York Courts lack uniformity in whether
to apply the subjective test or follow the Federal objective
reasonableness standard. The courts that apply the subjective test
and focus on whether a traffic violation was the primary
motivation for stopping the vehicle have failed to provide a
structural framework for determining whether a stop is
pretextual. Seemingly, in light of this failure, the Appellate
Courts of New York are split as to what approach should be
applied.
Courtney Blakeslee
50 Id. at 23-24, 711 N.Y.S.2d at 389-90 (referring to People v. Jones, 219 A.D.2d
417, 643 N.Y.S.2d 987 (1st Dep't 1996). The court noted that in determining
whether probable cause exists, an "objective judicial determination of the facts
in existence and known to the officer" prevails over the officer's "subjective
evaluation." Id; see also Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. at 138 (1978) (stating
"the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind that is hypothecated by
the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not
invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively,
justify the action").
51 See, People v. Jones, 219 A.D.2d 417, 643 N.Y.S.2d 987 (1st Dep't 1996)
(holding that an objective determination prevails over the police officers
subjective state of mind); See also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1995).52 See People v. Jones, 219 A.D.2d 417, 643 N.Y.S.2d 987 (1st Dep't 1996).
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